The Modifications your talking about where the fitting of Kevlar protection to the fuel tanks they where not required that was because something had to be done, the modifications I was talking about was the rear wheel covers that British Airways advised the French to add to the rear gear to stop debris being flung into the underside of the wings and BA had noted that potentially could pierce the tanks Air France never carried out the modification and the aircraft was lost as BA had predicted.
Sorry, but that is conspiracy hoggish. BA never modified their undercarriage themselves. And such a rear wheel cover would never have worked on a plane like that anyway. All concordes have, like all many other planes, only water spray deflectors. Such a protection against blown tires can not even work on truck tires (A common cause for the really bad accidents here) and those are at a much lower pressure than aircraft tires. The concorde main landing gear bogie tires were at twice the pressure of a truck tire, 16 atm.
All articles about "installing a mudguard" on the Concorde landing gear in the year 2000 talk about the Kevlar liners in the fuel tank.
Much more critical is the theory, that Air France forgot to install an important part of the landing gear, a spacer, after a maintenance a few flights before the crash, which ultimatively resulted in the landing gear on one side blocking and skidding over the runway. Which could also have blown up the the tires, instead of the Titanium part found.
But the proponent of this theory also has many things wrong against available evidence - the copilot did not shutdown two engines, but just one, and this one was shutdown on command by the captain, contrary to the claims of the alternative theory. Also his claims about the length of the take-off run being longer than usual had been wrong, the BEA did simulate it and got a perfect match for wind conditions and MTOW. Which also fits to the evidence and the checklists: The damaged light was 2800 meters down the runway, the minimum take-off distance is 2770 meters in favorable conditions and with low MTOW. But with tailwind and high MTOW, like in this flight, the take-off distance is near its safe maximum of 3700 meters - the take-off run (on the ground) is only 300 meters shorter. And contrary to his claims, the BEA report did NOT ignore the MTOW or wind conditions, just like the captain didn't (before take-off run, he speaks exactly about these factors on the CVR). And the BEA report also talks about the missing spacer on page 150 and gives its effect a number: 1000N more drag on that side, not enough to cause the aircraft to get out of control. Also the wheels could not block and there is no evidence of a wobble or oscillation.
https://www.bea.aero/docspa/2000/f-sc000725a/pdf/f-sc000725a.pdf
BEA report said:
- Repeating the calculations for the flight preparation showed that the estimated weight of the aircraft on departure was in accordance with operational limits.
- Taking into account the fuel not consumed during taxiing, the aircraft’s takeoff weight in fact exceeded the maximum weight by about one ton. Any effect on takeoff performance from this excess weight was negligible.
Because many of the victims of the crash had been Germans, the German public TV broadcaster Phoenix had produced a very recommendable three part documentary about the crash.
BTW, I really recommend reading this long history of Concorde accidents:
http://www.concordesst.com/accident/past.html
In total statistics, the Concorde had 57 blown tires without such issues and one major case in 1979 (In Washington-Dulles) of a left landing gear tire explosion leading to a similar consequences as during Paris. Contrary to the event in Paris, the fuel did not catch fire and the plane landed again in Washington without further problems.
Yes, that is the upper side of the wing that was also pierced.