Launch News Soyuz MS-10 Orbit Failure (developing story)

[DaveS]

[ame="https://twitter.com/SpaceflightNow/status/1050426161615032321"]Spaceflight Now on Twitter: "NASA photographer Bill Ingalls captured these photos at the moment the Soyuz booster failed around two minutes after liftoff from the Baikonur Cosmodrome. The rocket’s two crew members safely returned to Earth after the accident. https://t.co/9RFyAxjq6s… https://t.co/hatYgl0bvp"[/ame]

 

[Urwumpe]

Or this one:


Image of the Soyuz MS-10 launch as seen from the International Space Station by Alexander Gerst, auf Flickr

 

[4throck]

Nah, NASA needs to bite the bullet and take a risk by flying an operational mission ASAP.

I think that a first full automated mission (no crew) makes sense, specially because that capability might save the crew latter on.
And automation would be new thing compared to Apollo or STS.

I don't think there's a big risk with a capsule + LES / abort system.
The Soyuz just proved that once again.
If NASA thinks flying a capsule is risky then its all over...

 

[Linguofreak]

And about comparing safety, well, its too easy to compare a program with no LOCV in 15 missions to one that had two in 135 missions. How safe would Apollo have been, would it have been used exactly the same way as the Shuttle?

The entire problem with the Shuttle is that the design features meant to enable that usage made it a death trap. Apollo was safer because it wasn't trying to be a reusable vehicle 30+ years before reusability was feasible.

In any case, to bring things back to Soyuz MS-10, this is exactly the sort of failure that is a guaranteed LOCV for a side-of-stack spaceplane (and likely for a top-of-stack spaceplane), but not a huge problem for an Apollo/Soyuz style capsule.

The point I was making is, whatever the Russians actually do, they can afford to keep flying manned missions while they investigate, because even if this happens again, there's not a huge risk of LOCV.

We will never really know, because Apollo was not even made for it - it was never made to be reusable, never meant to be turned around on the ground and especially never made to do this in mere 54 days as it happened between STS-51-J and STS-61B. The Saturn V needed half a year to be assembled in first place, from the arrival of the first component at the cape to launch readiness review - and it needed seven times more workers for it than the STS.what I see there.

For LEO missions, such as to the ISS, you'd probably use a Saturn I adapted for mass production, which I imagine could be made fairly cheap through a half century of routine use.

 

[Urwumpe]

The entire problem with the Shuttle is that the design features meant to enable that usage made it a death trap. Apollo was safer because it wasn't trying to be a reusable vehicle 30+ years before reusability was feasible.

It was very well feasible 133 times. And no death trap for hundreds of astronauts.



Yes, it failed badly two times. But then, its still doubtful Apollo would have survived similar accidents. A massive booster failure? A damaged heat shield? Even if you include that the Shuttle failed because of inherent design flaws, this doesn't mean those didn't exist in Apollo as well.



Apollo simply had one key feature: A lot of luck. It had a lot more anomalies per mission than the Space Shuttle still nobody died. It required a lot of changed from mission to mission to address them. Remembering Apollo 13? How would this have gone out if the heatshield got damaged in the explosion?


How would Apollo 12 had ended if the pyros fired already on launch as feared? or if the booster disintegrated below them because of POGO? It was a real danger.

Remembering that the Apollo 1 hatch was designed that way because one of the astronauts killed in the fire experienced a hatch failure?



Its easy to view Apollo with a lot of survivor bias. But that doesn't work.

 

[Kyle]

Just shocking, I never thought we'd see a manned Soyuz failure again.

 

[DaveS]

HOLY CRAP!!!
It seems the core went boom... :blink:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CnQlj73NIm4

I just have to post this: Did anyone else notice the "twang" of the vehicle during the thrust build up? It can be seen in the above video starting at 0:23. I compared it to the Soyuz MS-09 launch which was shown from a similar angle and I didn't notice any "twainging" with that one.

The only thing that could case such a thing on an inline thrust vector launch vehicle such as the Soyuz, is asymmetrical thrust build up. Maybe one of the 1st stage boosters didn't perform as it should have and damaged something related to the separation mechanisms? Mainly I'm thinking cabling, that some cables got either cut or damaged enough to inhibit the firing signals from reaching the actual mechanisms.

 

[Kyle]

It looks like one of the boosters recontacted with the second stage to me, which resulted in a rapid depressurization of the second stage.

 

[MaverickSawyer]

It looks like one of the boosters recontacted with the second stage to me, which resulted in a rapid depressurization of the second stage.

That does seem to be the general consensus, even from Roscosmos. I've also seen a report that claims the telemetry feed showed a pyrotechnic charge involved in the jettison of the booster didn't fire, and that compromised the booster's ability to swing clear of the core.
Regardless of which part actually failed, the question becomes... why? Why did the part fail, and was it preventable?

 

[Thorsten]

Nah, NASA needs to bite the bullet and take a risk by flying an operational mission ASAP. There's a time and place for being cautious to the point of paranoia... This isn't one of them. It's spaceflight... It's inherently risky no matter how well you prepare, as today shows. But you cannot let the fear of failure stop you.

Typically before something happens, people say things like the above - one needs to take a risk.

After something happens, everyone agrees that that particular risk should have been anticipated and prevented.

So generally it seems prudent to try to anticipate as many risks as possible (there's still enough risk-taking left).

***

I suspect what NASA actually needs is a degree independence of day-to-day politics. Given the way the US funding works, a new election means new priorities, funding for new projects, possibly a new administrator,...

Try organizing a space program (or any research program) if you don't know up-front how much money you'll have next year or whether someone will not scrap it three years from now.

Right now manned spaceflight is en vogue again - might not be so after the next election.

 

[MaverickSawyer]

Typically before something happens, people say things like the above - one needs to take a risk.

After something happens, everyone agrees that that particular risk should have been anticipated and prevented.

So generally it seems prudent to try to anticipate as many risks as possible (there's still enough risk-taking left).

To an extent, yes. That said, there's a balance to be struck between what's considered to be an acceptable risk and what's not acceptable, and NASA's idea of where that balance point is lies far too deeply in the "safe" category. They're trying to make it to the point where an astronaut would be more likely to be killed in the gym than in a spacecraft. I'm sure that, if you asked the astronauts who will fly missions, they'd be willing to accept a fairly high risk, far more so than NASA administrators would. And let's face it, there's been how many failures of the Soyuz family over the years? Four fatalities and three aborts across almost 50 years of service, and how many people have been safely carried by it?

I suspect what NASA actually needs is a degree independence of day-to-day politics. Given the way the US funding works, a new election means new priorities, funding for new projects, possibly a new administrator,...

Try organizing a space program (or any research program) if you don't know up-front how much money you'll have next year or whether someone will not scrap it three years from now.

Right now manned spaceflight is en vogue again - might not be so after the next election.

I absolutely agree, but would also add that they need to be less willing to put up with contractor shenanigans. Right now, they simply roll over and cough up more money whenever a flagship program runs overbudget and behind schedule. *cough cough SLS cough*
Either that, or have more compressed timeframes for programs. Kennedy had it right... 10 years or less. By the time you're punted from the White House, the program is too far along to simply cancel. None of this "To the Moon... in 15 years" or "To Mars... in 20 years" bull...

 

[Thorsten]

I'm sure that, if you asked the astronauts who will fly missions, they'd be willing to accept a fairly high risk, far more so than NASA administrators would.

The astronauts don't pay for the program - the taxpayer does. The question is what risk the taxpayer (and by extension the politicians) considers acceptable and at what point they will start to whack the administrators.

Assume a serious accident occurs and a crew gets killed under huge news media coverage - how many politicians will stand and say 'We told NASA to take a risk, unfortunately it hasn't paid off.' and how many will give interviews 'This is a completely inaceptable failure by NASA and the administration will bear the consequences - heads will roll'.

So given that - what would you do if you ran NASA? The public orders the image of a risk-free space program, NASA administration tries to deliver.

 

[GLS]

I just have to post this: Did anyone else notice the "twang" of the vehicle during the thrust build up? It can be seen in the above video starting at 0:23. I compared it to the Soyuz MS-09 launch which was shown from a similar angle and I didn't notice any "twainging" with that one.

The only thing that could case such a thing on an inline thrust vector launch vehicle such as the Soyuz, is asymmetrical thrust build up. Maybe one of the 1st stage boosters didn't perform as it should have and damaged something related to the separation mechanisms? Mainly I'm thinking cabling, that some cables got either cut or damaged enough to inhibit the firing signals from reaching the actual mechanisms.

That twang is usual, I've seen it several times. Yes, it happens because the side engines don't ignite at *exactly* the same time, and that makes the vehicle wobble as it is not sitting on something, but actually "hanging by the waist" on those 4 arms. When the thrust is greater than the mass, the vehicle starts rising, releasing those arms, that then move away under counter weight effect.
AFAIK no explosives or hydraulics are used, just the vehicle rising and gravity on the counter-weights, or "god's force" as they called it :lol:.

 

[Urwumpe]

That twang is usual, I've seen it several times. Yes, it happens because the side engines don't ignite at *exactly* the same time, and that makes the vehicle wobble as it is not sitting on something, but actually "hanging by the waist" on those 4 arms. When the thrust is greater than the mass, the vehicle starts rising, releasing those arms, that then move away under counter weight effect.
AFAIK no explosives or hydraulics are used, just the vehicle rising and gravity on the counter-weights, or "god's force" as they called it :lol:.

Also, if there is enough wind, the vehicle will also sway in it a lot. Its a common observation for R-7 launchers.

---------- Post added at 09:53 ---------- Previous post was at 09:41 ----------

So given that - what would you do if you ran NASA? The public orders the image of a risk-free space program, NASA administration tries to deliver.

The public is the problem there - who is the public and where does he live? :tiphat:


In reality, we are not having one public speaking with one voice, but many. And among those, politicians will often listen to the loudest, not to the wisest.



Its a matter of culture. How would it be like, if seven astronauts get killed, but instead of being condemned for every error nobody else did see before, people respect that you really did what is possible to prevent it and will learn for your mistakes?


(Yeah, NASA had to get the blame there for NOT doing what is possible and ignoring known problems in the past. But still: Its not easy to do it better, despite many here thinking they could be the better NASA administrator)

 

[GLS]

This is certainly interesting:

Images available from the BSVK video system confirmed abnormal behavior of the D strap-on booster of the first stage with the failed oxidizer valve

http://russianspaceweb.com/soyuz-ms-10.html
So it seems the vehicle carried a "rocket cam".... now the question is, "where can I see it?" :hmm:

 

[Urwumpe]

This is certainly interesting:

http://russianspaceweb.com/soyuz-ms-10.html
So it seems the vehicle carried a "rocket cam".... now the question is, "where can I see it?" :hmm:

Is it really the oxidizer vent valve at the top of the Block D, as I guessed? Or another valve near the engines?

 

[GLS]

Is it really the oxidizer vent valve at the top of the Block D, as I guessed? Or another valve near the engines?

Should be the vent valve at the top... that is the one that opens at that time.

 

[Urwumpe]

Should be the vent valve at the top... that is the one that opens at that time.

Yes, that is what I guessed from the videos - that the propulsive vent of one side stages during separation failed and the supersonic airflow pushed it back into the core.

Also, the fragment that separated before the boosters was the launch escape tower, three seconds before booster staging, it likely causes the small puff in every Soyuz launch before staging.

 

[Thorsten]

Its a matter of culture. How would it be like, if seven astronauts get killed, but instead of being condemned for every error nobody else did see before, people respect that you really did what is possible to prevent it and will learn for your mistakes?

Certainly much different.

But in the US fastfood chains print 'Careful - beverage may be hot' on coffee cups and microwaves come with the hint that they're not suitable for drying animals. It's a culture were it's common to blame someone if things go wrong and where lawyers make good money of it.

(The problem is of course - do we know for sure that you really did what is possible, or did you perhaps try to save money or rush a timetable... As every so often, there's two kinds of errors one can make, and finding a good balance may not be easy. What if it takes 20 years to go to Mars but costs 500 lives to do so and 50 years with just three dead? What option would be acceptable? I don't think there's easy and unique answers - but it'd be good to discuss based on actual risk assessments and probability theory rather than gut feeling. I still have the Shuttle catastrophic failure probabilities in mind where the administration said 1/10.000 and all the technicans said more like 1/100... )

 

[Urwumpe]

The problem is of course - do we know for sure that you really did what is possible, or did you perhaps try to save money or rush a timetable... As every so often, there's two kinds of errors one can make, and finding a good balance may not be easy. What if it takes 20 years to go to Mars but costs 500 lives to do so and 50 years with just three dead? What option would be acceptable? I don't think there's easy and unique answers - but it'd be good to discuss based on actual risk assessments and probability theory rather than gut feeling. I still have the Shuttle catastrophic failure probabilities in mind where the administration said 1/10.000 and all the technicans said more like 1/100... )

Well, one way to test it for example is: Do reports of that problem exist before? How was the risk assessed and managed?

Spaceflight should be very honest and open about its risks, not secretive. Its too dangerous to not learn from the mistakes of others.

And yes, I would rather trust the technicians and engineers there. :lol: