Operation Dynamo 80 years on.

[Notebook]

We are half-way through this event. Surprisingly not much on the UK media, got other things at the moment...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunkirk_evacuation

Not a victory, not a defeat, not what was wanted.

 

[Notebook]

Operation Dynamo finished:

 

[Artlav]

Wasn't that a double edged event?
It basically concluded and underscored one of Hitler's greatest military triumphs.

 

[Notebook]

Yes, double-edged indeed.
Outmanoeuvred and forced to evacuate leaving most of their equipment behind.

The Naval part seems to be well handled.

Dunkirk has a sort of mythical status in the UK, though that is fading as it ages.
It could have been a complete disaster with the French and other armies destroyed.
I suppose that's the relief at the time it didn't happen.

As Churchill said.

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill called this "a colossal military disaster", saying "the whole root and core and brain of the British Army" had been stranded at Dunkirk and seemed about to perish or be captured.[7] In his "we shall fight on the beaches" speech on 4 June, he hailed their rescue as a "miracle of deliverance".[8]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunkirk_evacuation

 

[Urwumpe]

It really leaves the question, what would have happened without Hitlers orders to stop, despite the German army having the momentum and the initiative.

He constantly feared, based on WW1 concepts of warfare, that his flanks could be outmaneuvered and thus often ordered the tank units to stop, despite them having the momentum and strategic advantage.

Patton once explained in his usual eloquence, why this is a stupid fear to have: "Some fool once said that flanks have got to be secure. Since then all over the globe have been guarding their flanks. I don't agree with that. My flanks are something for the enemy to worry about, not me. Before he finds out where my flanks are, I'll be cutting the throat."

 

[Notebook]

If Churchill survived political oppositions for negotiations, he would have ordered a stand and fight. Did that to the Calais garrison to buy time. Also ordered the French Fleet sunk if they wouldn't agree to his terms. Quite ruthless.

Would have left the UK without an Army, still had the Navy and RAF.
Invasion at that time, probably fail?
UK in poor position to continue fighting in North Africa.

Good job Hitler was more interested in the East.

 

[Urwumpe]

Good job Hitler was more interested in the East.

Its a two sided sword. On one hand, it was great that Hitler was not even close to the strategic genius, that he claimed to be.



On the other hand, even a strategic half-wit would not have started a war against such odds. You don't start a fight, if you can't win. And despite all early successes against rusted enemies. Poland was mostly still fighting like its 1831. And Petain did not realize its not 1918 again, with the French army perfectly trained and equipped to fight a second WW1 again. The Germans had even been so nice to begin the war against France with the same opening move as 1914 (Violate Belgian neutrality, cut off France from the channel.) Some things likely never change.

 

[Notebook]

England was lucky in many ways. If there had been a land-bridge, we wouldn't be having this conversation. Or forum, for that matter.

 

[Linguofreak]

It really leaves the question, what would have happened without Hitlers orders to stop, despite the German army having the momentum and the initiative.

He constantly feared, based on WW1 concepts of warfare, that his flanks could be outmaneuvered and thus often ordered the tank units to stop, despite them having the momentum and strategic advantage.

Patton once explained in his usual eloquence, why this is a stupid fear to have: "Some fool once said that flanks have got to be secure. Since then all over the globe have been guarding their flanks. I don't agree with that. My flanks are something for the enemy to worry about, not me. Before he finds out where my flanks are, I'll be cutting the throat."

So basically, you're saying that Hitler was a proponent of Blödskrieg?

---------- Post added at 07:10 ---------- Previous post was at 07:04 ----------

If Churchill survived political oppositions for negotiations, he would have ordered a stand and fight. Did that to the Calais garrison to buy time. Also ordered the French Fleet sunk if they wouldn't agree to his terms. Quite ruthless.

Mers El Kebir 1940: When Britain Blew Up the French Fleet - YouTube

The ironic thing is that the French admiral had orders to accept one of the options offered if the British demanded it (sail for the US). But he took a hissy fit because he did not feel that the British ultimatum was delivered by an officer of sufficient rank to do him honor.

 

[Urwumpe]

So basically, you're saying that Hitler was a proponent of Blödskrieg?

Pretty much, yes.



He liked the successes and likely got into false security when trying the same with the USSR, but he never really got the concept. While Blitzkrieg tactics are generally working well with Prussian command style, they are incompatible with dictatorial micromanagement.

 

[Linguofreak]

On the other hand, even a strategic half-wit would not have started a war against such odds. You don't start a fight, if you can't win. And despite all early successes against rusted enemies. Poland was mostly still fighting like its 1831. And Petain did not realize its not 1918 again, with the French army perfectly trained and equipped to fight a second WW1 again. The Germans had even been so nice to begin the war against France with the same opening move as 1914 (Violate Belgian neutrality, cut off France from the channel.) Some things likely never change.

But were the odds really that long? In GDP terms, the Allies in 1940 were as badly outmatched as the Axis was after the US became involved. If not for US involvement, things would have been much more up in the air. I doubt Britain or Russia would ever have fallen entirely, but a negotiated settlement in which German hegemony over continental Europe was acknowledged was, I think, within the realm of possibility.

But for evidence that Hitler wasn't a great strategic genius, there's the Norwegian campaign. Yeah, it went well because the RN got caught with its pants down, but if it hadn't been, the Kriegsmarine would likely have been annihilated there and then.

 

[Notebook]

Lost a lot of valuable destroyers though.

The official German casualties for the Norwegian Campaign totalled 5,296. Of these 1,317 were killed on land, while 2,375 were lost at sea. 1,604 were listed as wounded.[110][111]
The German losses at sea were heavy, with the sinking of one of the Kriegsmarine's two heavy cruisers, two of its six light cruisers, 10 of its 20 destroyers and six U-boats. With several more ships severely damaged, the German surface fleet had only three cruisers and four destroyers operational in the aftermath of the Norwegian Campaign.[1][112] Two torpedo boats and 15 light naval units were also lost during the campaign.[113] Two German battleships and two cruisers were damaged during the campaign.[114]
Official German sources give the number of German aircraft lost during the Norwegian Campaign as 90, with other estimates by historian François Kersaudy ranging as high as 240.[113]
In transport ships and merchant vessels, the Germans lost 21 ships at 111,700 tons, around 10% of what they had available at the time.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norwegian_campaign#German_2

 

[Urwumpe]

But were the odds really that long? In GDP terms, the Allies in 1940 were as badly outmatched as the Axis was after the US became involved. If not for US involvement, things would have been much more up in the air. I doubt Britain or Russia would ever have fallen entirely, but a negotiated settlement in which German hegemony over continental Europe was acknowledged was, I think, within the realm of possibility.

Its not so much the strength in numbers as the strategic situation. Like in WW1, the UK does not even need many ships to effectively lock the German Navy in German waters. Germany would have needed much more there and a much stronger and present airforce, to compensate for the poor geography and lack of resources. Not even having a single aircraft carrier available at the start of the war was another deadly blunder there.

But for evidence that Hitler wasn't a great strategic genius, there's the Norwegian campaign. Yeah, it went well because the RN got caught with its pants down, but if it hadn't been, the Kriegsmarine would likely have been annihilated there and then.

Yeah it was close to disaster. Especially he was so focussed on capturing the royal family, that he oversaw the trouble elsewhere. And when Hitlers focus moved to new battlefields, it was easy to give the local commanders a hard time - and make Hitler their second enemy.

 

[Linguofreak]

Its not so much the strength in numbers as the strategic situation. Like in WW1, the UK does not even need many ships to effectively lock the German Navy in German waters.

The thing is, I actually think in WWI that the German Navy had a half decent chance of doing serious damage to the RN had it been allowed to be more aggressive.

It's easy to moan about what could have been if Beatty's signal officer hadn't screwed up at Dogger Bank, but between the outcome of the Run to the South at Jutland, and trying to win as the British in Steam and Iron, I'm fairly convinced that the historical outcome at Dogger Bank was about the best possible for the British.

As for Jutland, if 5th Battle Squadron is managed properly (which didn't happen historically), the British can envelop and annihilate Hipper, but it's easy to have those gains reversed by losses to the Grand Fleet in the subsequent general fleet action.

But in WWII, the Kriegsmarine was in no shape to pull off similar feats.

 

[Urwumpe]

Well, considering how often Germany got into the worse tactical position during Jutland, I am pretty sure, switching sides and letting English officers command German ships would have been a disaster for the Germans in the British ships.

Far too often, the robust quality of the German ships outweighted their lack of firepower and speed, and pretty often allowed the Germans to survive what would have been a fatal error for other navies (Think of Russia against Japan in Tsushima there, which effectively already lost the battle before the first shot was fired)

 

[Artlav]

Fun fact - dynamo is phonetically close to a Russian word for someone who stood up a date or bailed out on agreement.

 

[Furet]

The ironic thing is that the French admiral had orders to accept one of the options offered if the British demanded it (sail for the US). But he took a hissy fit because he did not feel that the British ultimatum was delivered by an officer of sufficient rank to do him honor.

It's quite disturbing to see the differences in Wikipedia articles depending on the language ...

In English:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_on_Mers-el-Kébir#Ultimatum

The most powerful group of French warships was at Mers-el-Kébir in French Algeria, comprising the old battleships Provence and Bretagne, the newer Force de Raid battleships Dunkerque and Strasbourg, the seaplane tender Commandant Teste, six destroyers and a gunboat, under the command of Admiral Marcel-Bruno Gensoul. Admiral James Somerville, commander of Force H, based in Gibraltar, was ordered to deliver an ultimatum to the French whose terms were contrary to the German-French armistice. Somerville passed the duty of presenting the ultimatum to a French speaker, Captain Cedric Holland, commander of the carrier HMS Ark Royal. Gensoul was affronted that negotiations were not being conducted by a senior officer and sent his lieutenant, Bernard Dufay, which led to much delay and confusion. As negotiations dragged on, it became clear that neither side was likely to give way. Darlan was at home on 3 July and could not be contacted; Gensoul told the French government that the alternatives were internment or battle but omitted the option of sailing to the French West Indies.Removing the fleet to United States waters had formed part of the orders given by Darlan to Gensoul in the event that a foreign power should attempt to seize his ships.

In French (Google translated):
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attaque_de_Mers_el-Kébir#L'ultimatum

Admiral James Somerville therefore received orders to set sail in order to put the French fleet based in Mers el-Kebir out of action. Arriving at dawn on July 3 in front of the naval base, Admiral Somerville sent a telegram to Wing Vice-Admiral Marcel Gensoul imposing an ultimatum, the term of which failed six hours later. He made three proposals:

either the French fleet joined the British fleet in its fight against Nazi Germany;
either she scuttled;
either it reached the British, American or French ports of the Antilles in order to be disarmed.

This ultimatum amounted to requiring France to honor its commitments vis-à-vis the United Kingdom, contracted on March 28, 1940, which would have broken the armistice which had just been signed to suspend the fighting between France and Germany.

According to Kammerer, a diplomat opposed to the armistice of June 1940, there were four proposals (and not three or two): the proposal to join American ports would indeed have been very different from that to join British ports, since the The United States - officially neutral - had not yet entered the war. Kammerer writes in a 1945 work that it is the Vichy government that will have made believe that the ultimatum left the choice only to rally to England or to scuttle itself.

According to the French sailors who survived, it would appear that Gensoul's intention was to scuttle (or at least sabotage his French squadron to make it unusable) and that he would have informed Somerville of it. However, still according to Kammerer, Gensoul would have waited for orders from the government (which was in the process of settling in Vichy). A possible modification of the status of the fleet, preserved to French sovereignty by the terms of the armistice, could only be done by agreement of the armistice committee (including the Germans), Vichy's orders could not have been according to Kammerer go in the direction of a scuttling.

In the course of the afternoon, a compromise was about to be found, after Somerville had extended its deadline. But one of Darlan's deputies, vice-admiral Maurice Le Luc, according to Kammerer, reported by radio to Gensoul that the French squadrons of Toulon and Algiers were coming to his rescue. The British would have received this message and London then ordered Somerville to open fire.

 

[Notebook]

Operation Catapult[edit]
Plymouth and Alexandria[edit]

Along with French vessels in metropolitan ports, some had sailed to ports in Britain or to Alexandria in Egypt.
Operation Catapult was an attempt to take these ships under British control or destroy them and the French ships in Plymouth and Portsmouth were boarded without warning on the night of 3 July 1940.[12][13]
The submarine Surcouf, the largest in the world, had been berthed in Plymouth since June 1940.[14] The crew resisted a boarding party and three Royal Navy personnel, including two officers, were killed along with a French sailor.
Other ships captured included the old battleships Paris and Courbet, the destroyers Le Triomphant and Léopard, eight torpedo boats, five submarines and a number of lesser ships.
The French squadron in Alexandria (Admiral René-Émile Godfroy) including the battleship Lorraine, heavy cruiser Suffren and three modern light cruisers, was neutralised by local agreement.[15]

Perfidious Albion again, but such is war.