Launch News [Sep.1, 2016] Falcon 9 explodes on the Launch Pad

[Urwumpe]

I'm not saying they'd have no sympathy. I'm saying they're going to want to know, in exacting detail, why the booster went up like that.

Why? No USAF launcher. No USAF payload. Not even a USAF launch complex, even if its on USAF property. When you have rented an apartment, you have all (granted) rights to use it, even if you are not the owner, same happens here.

USAF is a stackholder for range safety - in that context they will be involved. Not more, they will be interested if range safety was compromised: Which was not the case during the test.

 

[MaverickSawyer]

When you have rented an apartment, you have all (granted) rights to use it, even if you are not the owner, same happens here.

And what happens if you trash the apartment? Landlord can (and probably will) be asking some very pointed questions about what you've been doing.

 

[Urwumpe]

And what happens if you trash the apartment? Landlord can (and probably will) be asking some very pointed questions about what you've been doing.

Not really. if you use the apartment as allowed by the contract (What SpaceX is absolutely doing there - launching and testing rockets, including a chance of failure), your landlord can't ask questions.

 

[orb]

SpaceNews: SpaceX may shift Falcon 9 launches to KSC’s Pad 39A

 

[Hlynkacg]

I think you misunderstood the argument - it is one of incentive structure.

...

I think until enough spaceflight experience has accumulated to pass reasonable regulations for an industry, it ought to be seen as a money sink, not as a money source - you can dump money into it, not get it out.

I disagree.

As the NASA vs Russian Space Program comparison illustrates, putting "safety first" is substantially less effective at producing actual safety than having a mature technology and an experienced work-force. The surest way to build that is to stop looking at the industry as a "money sink" and give people an active incentive to pursue it.

It seems clear to me that NASA's emphasis on safety has lead them to fly less and made them reluctant to iterate. The result is technology that never matures and a work force with very little practical experience. Counterintuitively this means that flying with the very safety conscious NASA is arguably less safe than the leading alternatives.

In short I think Mike Rowe's comment on crab fishing applies here as it does in many other high risk endeavors. "Don't worry about OSHA, worry about the Ocean"

 

[Quick_Nick]

SpaceNews: SpaceX may shift Falcon 9 launches to KSC’s Pad 39A

The SpaceX statement, for lazy forum lurkers like me:

As for the Launch Pad itself, our teams are now investigating the status of SLC-40. The pad clearly incurred damage, but the scope has yet to be fully determined. We will share more data as it becomes available. SpaceX currently operates 3 launch pads – 2 in Florida and 1 in California at Vandenberg Air Force Base. SpaceX's other launch sites were not affected by yesterday's events. Space Launch Complex 4E at Vandenberg Air Force Base is in the final stages of an operational upgrade and Launch Complex 39A at Kennedy Space Center remains on schedule to be operational in November. Both pads are capable of supporting Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy launches. We are confident the two launch pads can support our return to flight and fulfill our upcoming manifest needs.

 

[Thorsten]

I disagree.

As the NASA vs Russian Space Program comparison illustrates, putting "safety first" is substantially less effective at producing actual safety than having a mature technology and an experienced work-force. The surest way to build that is to stop looking at the industry as a "money sink" and give people an active incentive to pursue it.

Sorry - you lost me.

Before Challenger detonated, NASA's line was pretty commercial 'On time, every time'. The result did manifestly not produce any safety. I don't see how NASA would have followed a consistent 'safety first' policy then.

Not even in the Shuttle design - initially the idea was to never launch people on solids, but when this was the cheapest option it was done anyway. So the whole history of the Shuttle design and a large part of its operation actually is a lesson in what's wrong with trying to make the figures on the balance sheet match.

 

[Urwumpe]

Quality assurance is both: Methodology and experience.

Just operating a bad system long enough does not work, the Russians had been really clever in improving their R-7 rocket in small steps and observing if the improvement was really advancing quality. Once Russia started to change the launcher in bigger steps, the quality dropped.

Same applies to the US Atlas-Centaur launcher, which was equally successful after initial problems had been fixed.

---------- Post added at 08:09 PM ---------- Previous post was at 08:07 PM ----------

Sorry - you lost me.

Before Challenger detonated, NASA's line was pretty commercial 'On time, every time'. The result did manifestly not produce any safety. I don't see how NASA would have followed a consistent 'safety first' policy then.

Not even in the Shuttle design - initially the idea was to never launch people on solids, but when this was the cheapest option it was done anyway. So the whole history of the Shuttle design and a large part of its operation actually is a lesson in what's wrong with trying to make the figures on the balance sheet match.

Without the solids, its doubtful the STS would ever have lifted off... it already was too expensive without the relatively cheap solid rocket boosters.

Yes, it was another foul compromise in a time, when the NASA budget was rapidly slashed down by 90%.

 

[Thorsten]

Without the solids, its doubtful the STS would ever have lifted off...

True - which shows that politicians looking on the balance sheet and expecting results before the next election are about as helpful as shareholders looking on the balance sheet and expecting results within the next reporting period.

Yes, it was another foul compromise in a time, when the NASA budget was rapidly slashed down by 90%.

That likely led to higher operating cost later, and, combined with pressure to launch on-time, to the loss of a spacecraft.

Edit: To give an example of how one can do things in different ways. CERN and BNL (Brookhaven Lab) are both major accelerator facilities. BNL has a yearly budget to be determined by Congress - it can be slashed, or changed - they have no way of knowing even two years in advance. Which makes operations difficult.

CERN is an international organization getting membership fees from the participant countries. They can even take loans with future membership fees as security - so they can have a budget for the next 12-15 years and plan well ahead.

Think this makes a difference? You bet.

 

[Hlynkacg]

Sorry - you lost me.

I think we can agree that the Russian space program places less emphasis on "safety consciousness" than NASA does. I also hope that we can agree that, urban legends about Soviet cover-ups aside, the Russian space program has sustained fewer casualties despite maintaining a higher flight rate.

I know it sounds counter-intuitive but safety does not come first when it comes to operating a dangerous equipment safely. Operating the equipment comes first.

In many ways NASA is the worst of both worlds incentives-wise, there is political & public relations pressure to deliver "On time, every time" but the feedback mechanisms that you'd see in a private venture are absent. NASA doesn't have to worry about declaring bankruptcy, and the only people who have to worry about loosing their jobs if a NASA spacecraft blows up are the astronauts

---------- Post added at 21:19 ---------- Previous post was at 21:18 ----------

Just operating a bad system long enough does not work.

Granted, but you'll never develop a "good" system if you if you don't work the bugs out of your prototypes, and in order to do that you need to actually put them through their paces.

 

[Thorsten]

I think we can agree that the Russian space program places less emphasis on "safety consciousness" than NASA does. I also hope that we can agree that, urban legends about Soviet cover-ups aside, the Russian space program has sustained fewer casualties despite maintaining a higher flight rate.

As I tried to explain before, there's most definitely different phases involved. Before Challenger I can not see how NASA particularly emphasized safety (except in PR speeches). Reading through the early history of the Soviet program, I think they just got extremely lucky - there were many risky schemes involved to be able to do something new quickly which might have equally well failed (Gagarin parachuting out of Vostok-1 as a landing strategy - seriously?)

So I doubt the casualty figures indicate what you claim - if the risk-taking would not have paid off, the numbers might be reversed.

I know it sounds counter-intuitive but safety does not come first when it comes to operating a dangerous equipment safely. Operating the equipment comes first.

Call me old-fashioned, but when I do chainsaw work I wear my safety trousers, my helmet, my reinforced boots, I take someone else with me, I wait for good light and I investigate before I cut whether there's tension in the wood - and then I worry about operating the saw. Not the other way round.

So no, what you say is not readily apparent to be true, neither do I think it is true.

if the engineer says 'hold the launch, the weather is too cold' and the manager says 'get this done on time or the customer will be unhappy', safety needs to be put before operation.

In many ways NASA is the worst of both worlds incentives-wise, there is political & public relations pressure to deliver "On time, every time" but the feedback mechanisms that you'd see in a private venture are absent.

Obviously there's more than one way to set up an agency - NASA worked very well while there was not much political interference going on and the engineers made decisions, NASA worked much worse when it tried to please commercial customers. The Soviet space program took enormous risks when outcomes were demanded by the politicians etc.

The point is that with a national or international agency, you can change the structure and free it from dangerous influences. With a company on the stock marked, you can not - that's by definition under market pressure from competition.

Which reliably has led to a race to the bottom in security standards whenever there was no regulation preventing it (why else do you think there's fair wage laws? Environment protection laws? Save workplace regulations? Because market feedback accomplishes all that? Or because it doesn't and it has to be enforced?)

We've seen during the financial crisis a few years back how well 'the market' is able to estimate and deal with relatively small but severe risks - basically not at all, even with highly trained mathematicians on the payroll, the models all failed.

So a century of market history tells that the market isn't good at producing save working conditions, is bad at long-term planning, isn't good at accessing small but crippling risks and is in fact very fond of taking risks. If that's the characteristics you want for a spaceflight project ask for the market to solve it

 

[Fabri91]

The SpaceX statement, for lazy forum lurkers like me:

Can the Vandenberg pad support launches to non-polar/highly-inclined orbits?

 

[Quick_Nick]

Can the Vandenberg pad support launches to non-polar/highly-inclined orbits?

Actually, no. The allowable launch azimuth range from Vandenberg is very much southward. No unnecessary flying over people, and SpaceX is probably the least likely entity to be given an exception.
(Old STS info; likely still accurate)

 

[Hlynkacg]

Call me old-fashioned, but when I do chainsaw work I wear my safety trousers, my helmet, my reinforced boots, I take someone else with me, I wait for good light and I investigate before I cut whether there's tension in the wood - and then I worry about operating the saw. Not the other way round.

Sure it's old fashioned, that doesn't necessarily make it correct. All that safety gear only matters after you've ed up. You want to avoid getting hurt? Your best chance is to not up in the first place. The US Navy spent a lot of time, a lot of money, and a lot of lives, figuring out that the most effective way to reduce aviation casualties was to beat basic airmanship and communication skills like a dead horse and let the rest of the issues take care of themselves.

NASA worked very well while there was not much political interference going on and the engineers made decisions...

Has there really ever been such a time?

 

[Thorsten]

You want to avoid getting hurt? Your best chance is to not up in the first place.

Sure. However, humans being humans however, we will make mistakes. It seems foolish to me to assume e.g. in software design that my colleague did the module correctly, so I can leave out any checks on the input data - rather better to assume that there are inevitably mistakes and design a procedure to catch them.

Likewise, rather better to assume that one day I will make a bad judgement or be overconfident with the chainsaw and have good protection on me rather than argue I'll be safe if I just never make a mistake.

So what kind of design principle is that supposed to be - just avoid mistakes? Have you ever managed that when coding?

Has there really ever been such a time?

They flew to the moon a couple of times while the Soviet N1 kept exploding... managed to bring Apollo 13 back...

At least talking to the people I know, that's regarded as the 'golden age' when the engineers' voices were heard and there was comparatively little influence from politicians. Again, from what I heard, things changed a lot during the Shuttle era.

So if your question is 'has it ever been optimal', then the answer is 'likely not' - if the question is 'have there been better times' then the answer is 'yeah, seems like'.

The consistent theme in space programs becoming unsafe is when engineering concerns are overruled due to other influences - so it seems prudent to give lots of weight to the opinion of those who actually designed the thing and less to the ones who look at the balance sheet. I'd put my money on the first group any day for risk assessment.

 

[Urwumpe]

Granted, but you'll never develop a "good" system if you if you don't work the bugs out of your prototypes, and in order to do that you need to actually put them through their paces.

Of course. Like in any development, regardless how much you test, you will always have to see it in the real environment to make sure your tests are valid in first place.

 

[Thorsten]

The US Navy spent a lot of time, a lot of money, and a lot of lives, figuring out that the most effective way to reduce aviation casualties was to beat basic airmanship and communication skills like a dead horse and let the rest of the issues take care of themselves.

If so, it didn't make it into the wikipedia article cited - the story there is quite different.

Numerous technical initiatives, including the angled flight deck on aircraft carriers in 1954 and various standardization programs, were credited with significantly reducing the rate to 19 major mishaps per 10,000 flight hours by 1961

Technical initiatives... like standardizing design, catching human errors,...

A lack of standardization and training in both aircraft maintenance and flight operations was cited as a causal factor in a large percentage of mishaps.

Now, here's my question: How often do airlines take their pilots out of the cockpit and send them to extra simulator training units?

a) the minimum the law mandates?
b) as often as the pilots would feel reasonable?

How often do you think airlines take their aircraft off-duty and do maintenance and inspections?

a) as the law mandates?
b) more often?

 

[PhantomCruiser]

You two are accidentally going to be in agreement here if you aren't careful...

A lack of standardization and training in both aircraft maintenance and flight operations was cited as a causal factor in a large percentage of mishaps.

... beat basic airmanship and communication skills like a dead horse ...

While using different words, these two statements are saying the same thing.

I was an airedale myself, now working in nuclear power. It pains me to see (despite all their human performance catch phrases) how moronic their (nuclear) maintenance can be. Simply because the culture of the aircraft world, while similar is vastly different from nuclear (or any other maintenance program I've ever seen). Nuclear ain't bad, these are really good craftsmen, but I tend to judge people by whether or not I'm willing to work with them on a flight deck. Since I left aircraft, there's been less than 10 people who fit that criteria (and they were all airedales).

I'll give you a for-instance. FOD, to an airedale it is driven into our very souls that FOD is an enemy (along with corrosion but that's a different story). FOD is a killer, and it must be stopped. It never sleeps and must be hunted down. It's in the culture of the airedale.
Here we call it FME (foreign materials exclusion) and the FME program is a joke compared to what I dealt with before. The nuclear world places a high priority on FME and it's still a joke to someone who'd worked on aircraft (for even one tour).
I left the NAVY 19 years ago, and I still have my tools silhouetted in all my toolboxes (both at work and at home).

 

[ADSWNJ]

In my view, space is always a balance between scientific research, cost controls, and schedules. Sometimes the schedule is commercially driven, sometimes launch window driven. RUD's are nature's way of reminding the thousands of engineers that work on these systems that this is an unforgiving business, and there are millions of components trying their hardest to fly apart under all the forces and chemistry.

I hope that there is enough data in those 3000 telemetry streams to quickly determine what happened, fix it, and RTF, so SpaceX can get back on their program again.

 

[Thorsten]

While using different words, these two statements are saying the same thing.

I guess it depends on your expectations.

Practices like

t. Prior to the FRS concept, qualified pilots transitioning to a new aircraft were essentially told how to start it, and then sent to go fly.

sound like extreme carelessness to me. It's like 'here's how to switch the chainsaw on, get to work'. Bound to produce accidents.

So by eliminating extreme carelessness, you reduce risk - it's obvious - I kind of expect that people do that, that they receive proper qualifications for their job. If you never tell anyone what cuts with a chainsaw are dangerous, he's not likely to be careful when he needs to.

In that respect, letting incompetent people do chainsaw work in proper equipment is probably more dangerous than letting compentent people do it without proper equipment. But that's hardly an argument to discard proper equipment, only to train people properly.

What I have in mind is the risk after you have competent people on their job - moments of overconfidence, the one morning when you haven't slept well - that kind of thing. Procedures and equipment need to be able to catch them, because they will occur no matter how competent people are.

If any space program operates by not training people for their job, then it doesn't really matter who runs it anyway.